

# **Usable Mobile Security**

Intel Institute for Collaborative Research in Helsinki, Finland

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### **About Finland**

### Home to leading universities

University of Helsinki: Traditional university

Aalto¹ University: Helsinki U. of Tech. + schools of design & business

Tampere University of Technology

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### Innovation hub

Local giants: Nokia, Ericsson, Nokia-Siemens, ...

Recent arrivals: Intel, Samsung, Huawei, ...

New tigers: Rovio, Supercell, ..., lots of startups



1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvar Aalto







## **ICRI-SC** Helsinki personnel

### Two researchers funded by Intel

Postdoc: Sini Ruohomaa

Graduate student: Thomas Nyman

### Matching funding by University

Postdoc (50%): Hien Truong

Graduate student: Sourav Bhattacharya (full-time from Jan)

Graduate student: Jian Liu

Graduate student: Tanel Dettenhorn (fill-time from Jan)

### Intel researchers pursuing PhD

Elena Reshetova (SSG/OTC)
Brian McGillion (MCG)

Secure Systems group http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/secures/

# \* Initial topics


Mobile security that is easy to use and inexpensive to deploy.


- 1. **Next generation hardware TEEs**: how to safely expose hardware-based *TEE functionality to app developers*?
- 2. Novel applications of platform security: can existing platform security mechanisms address security needs of new usage scenarios?
- 3. Malware insights: can we use *lightweight instrumentation* on a device to predict if it will (eventually) get malware?



## How prevalent is mobile malware?

domains. We make several important observations. The mobile malware found by the research community thus far appears in a minuscule number of devices in the network: 3,492 out of over 380 million (less than 0.0009%) observed during the course of our analysis. This result lends cre-







Get realistic data directly from devices


Estimate malware infection rate (for Android)

Identify risk factors

See if we can predict likelihood of infection!



# "The Company you Keep"



HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI http://carat.cs.berkeley.edu



### Incidence of infection

Type	Malware Genome	Mobile Sandbox	McAfee	Total
No. of dc matches (bad devcerts)	6	150	31	158
No. packages				



## Classifying based on set of apps

Can the set of apps run on device predict infection?

Classification attempt using Naïve Bayes (5-fold CV)

		Infected (prediction)	Clean (prediction)
	Infected (actual)	9	47
HELSINGIN YLIOPIS HELSINGFORS UNIV UNIVERSITY OF HELSI	Clean (actual)	753	29910

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### Classifying based on set of apps

Recall (9/56) and precision (9/762) low?

for classifying infected devices

Lightweight instrumentation: at virtually no cost

#### Supplementing AV tools, not replacing them

Could serve as inexpensive early warning?

Focus on a small subset for closer analysis

Competition: baseline = 0.18%!



### Predicting zero day malware

### Multinomial Naïve Bayes

#### Malware divided into 4 groups

2 groups constitute "unknown malware" in each round(6 combinations)

training set: 50% clean devices + devices infected by known malware (2 combinations)

test set: 50% clean devices + devices infected by unknown malware

#### 6 rounds, TP/FP ratio 5.0 times better than baseline

	Infected (prediction)	Clean (prediction)
Infected (actual)	32	304
Clean (actual)	3558	180420



### Predicting previously unknown malware

### Multinomial Naïve Bayes

#### Malware divided into 4 groups.


2 groups constitute "unknown malware" in each round(6 combinations) devices in training set (50% of all) containing unknown malware marked "clean" (2 combs.) devices in test set (50% of all) containing known malware removed before prediction

#### 6 rounds, TP/FP ratio 2.4 times better than baseline

	Infected (prediction)	Clean (prediction)
Infected (actual)	12	156
Clean (actual)	2776	181202



### Identify vulnerable devices **before** they are infected?





## 1. Secure Open Access to TEEs

**Question**: how to safely expose hardware-based *TEE functionality* to app developers?

#### Rationale:

- TEE hardware widespread; limited access to app developers
- Emerging standardization (Global Platform, TPM.2, TPM Mobile)

Use case: eg, Apps use TEE crypto for app-specific secure storage.

Stakeholder liaison: Brian McGillion (MCG)

Tanel Dettenhorn, Grad student



## 2. Novel Applications of Platsec

**Question**: can *existing platform security* mechanisms address security needs of *new usage scenarios*?

Rationale: Gap in platform security research and deployment.

#### **Sub themes:**

- how to securely migrate apps between devices using existing lightweight isolation mechanisms?
- can we aggregate feedback from social circles to ease user burden of authorizing apps?

Stakeholder liaison: Elena Reshetova (SSG/OTC)



## 3. Malware Insights

**Question**: can we use *lightweight instrumentation* on a device to predict if it will (eventually) get malware?

#### Rationale:

 signals indicative of user's habits (e.g., set of apps) may predict susceptibility to malware.

**Use case**: (1) cheaply identify suspicious apps for further analysis (2) corporate IT admin can monitor "health indicator" of BYO devices of employees

Stakeholder liaison: Igor Muttik (McAfee)

# \* Summary

Intel Collaborative Research Institute for Secure Computing expands to Finland.

Theme of research: usable mobile security

#### Began operations in August:

- 1. Next generation hardware TEEs
- 2. Novel applications of platform security
- 3. Malware insights