IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

IN RE INTEL CORPORATION MICROPROCESSOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION))) MDL No. 1717-JJF))
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, and AMD INTERNATIONAL SALES & SERVICES, LTD., a Delaware corporation,))))
Plaintiffs,)
v.) C.A. No. 05-441-JJF)
INTEL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and INTEL KABUSHIKI KAISHA, a Japanese corporation,)))
Defendants.)
PHIL PAUL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,)) C.A. No. 05-485-JJF
Plaintiffs,) CONSOLIDATED ACTION
V.)
	Ś
INTEL CORPORATION,)
Defendants.)

AMD'S RESPONSE TO INTEL'S SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON AMD'S EXPORT COMMERCE CLAIM

AMD respectfully submits this Response to Intel's Supplemental Submission in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on AMD's Export Commerce Claims.

INTRODUCTION

Intel's Supplemental Su	ıbmission proffers dep	osition testimony of	f former AMD ex	kecutive
Jerry Sanders. Intel contends	that	• • • • • •	• • • • • • • •	
	• • • • • •	• • • • • • •		
• • • • • • •	and	not because (as	AMD contends)	Intel's
unlawful conduct restricted A	AMD's market share.	Intel's Opening	Brief relied hea	vily on
evidence ostensibly indicating	that:	• • • • • • •	• • • • • • •	
	• • • • • •	• • • • • • • •		
• • • • • • •	See I	ntel Op. Br. 8-11.	As AMD has	already
demonstrated, however, Intel'	s Opening Brief—an	d hence its entire	motion—relied	on two

demonstrated, however, Intel's Opening Brief—and hence its entire motion—relied on two fundamental errors, one legal and the other factual. Intel's Supplemental Submission does nothing to resolve those legal errors, and thus does nothing to support Intel's motion.

The legal error in Intel's analysis was its failure to acknowledge that the basic question at issue here is what AMD could and would have done in 2001 if Intel's unlawful conduct had not artificially restricted demand for AMD's products. At that point, AMD's opposition brief demonstrated, AMD's only option would have been to deploy Fab 25 and to upgrade it as necessary in 2001 and 2002 to meet increasing demand. AMD Opp. 15-10. And even if AMD in 2001 did overestimate Fab 30's production capacity when it fully ramped two years later, that error would have become immediately evident when AMD tried to meet increased demand through production at Fab 30. The deposition testimony cited in Intel's Supplemental

Submission is thus wholly beside the point: no matter what AMD believed in 2001 about Fab 30's production capacity, if AMD had actually faced increased demand for its products, AMD could not in fact have met the demand through production at Fab 30, and thus would have been required to upgrade and continue producing at Fab 25. The factual error underlying Intel's motion was its failure to disclose *Id* at 9-10. Far from supporting Intel's motion, the deposition testimony now proffered by Intel Intel's Supplemental Submission also ignores other deposition testimony further undermining its motion, including testimony Finally, beyond the issues concerning recent deposition testimony, AMD anticipates submitting expert testimony on damages that will To ensure a complete understanding of the issue, AMD submits that the Court should await the filing of that testimony to rule on Intel's motion. ARGUMENT 1. To start, Intel's Supplement Submission is as off point as the motion it purportedly supports. The Submission proffers deposition testimony pertaining to

Intel mischaracterizes

but even on its own terms Intel's reliance on the deposition testimony is

misplaced. Intel continues to ignore the crucial point that its motion assumes, as it must, the truth of AMD's allegation that Intel committed unlawful conduct that artificially restricted demand for AMD products in 2001. Absent Intel's conduct, in other words, AMD would have experienced significantly increased demand for its products in 2001 and beyond. Thus, even assuming Intel is correct that in 2001 AMD overestimated the potential capacity of Fab 30 when fully ramped, if AMD had actually been forced to meet true market demand for its products, the limitations of Fab 30 would have become immediately evident. AMD would have been compelled to reverse the decision to terminate microprocessor production at Fab 25, and would have upgraded the facility to produce adequate quantities of microprocessors. AMD Opp. 16-19. The new deposition testimony is, in short, irrelevant to what AMD would have done between 2001 and 2003 if Intel's conduct had not depressed demand for AMD microprocessors.

2. Intel in any event continues to misstate the nature of AMD's statements about Fal		
30's capacity. Intel's Opening Brief relied on a document quoting Sanders as stating, during		
fall 2001 earnings conference call, that Fab 30 "can produce over 50 million units a year." Inte		
Op. Br. 9-10. Intel's Supplemental Submission now cites more recent deposition testimony from		
Sanders Deposition of Jerry Sanders		
111:11-112:10. ² According to Intel, that testimony		
Intel Supp. 2. But as AMD has already shown,		
• • • • • • • • • • • •		
AMD Opp. 8-9. At hi		
The statements Intel cites		
AMD Opp. 9-10.		

 $^{^2}$ A true and correct of the relevant pages from the Sanders Deposition transcript is attached as **Exhibit A**.

deposition, Sanders	• • • • • • • • • • • • •
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
In other words, Sander	s
	• • • • • • • • • • • • •
3. Intel's Supplemental Submis	sion also cites Sanders'
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •	Intel Supp. 3. But Intel fails to
disclose deposition testimony from Rive	t and Ruiz
•••••••	•
Intel's Opening Brief cited a state	ement, attributed to Rivet, that "[w]e can produce more
than 50 million units a year in that fab,"	from the same earnings call Sanders was on. Intel Op.
Br. 9-10.	• • • • • • • • • • • • •
	• • • • • • • • • • • • •
Deposition of Bob	Rivet, 264:15-265:4, and 267:12-268:3. Again, that
statement	• • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • •	
Intel's Opening Brief likewise att	ributed to Ruiz a statement that
mer 3 Opening Drief mewise are	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Int	el. Op. Br. 10. At his deposition, Ruiz testified

³ A true and correct of the relevant pages from the Rivet Deposition transcript is attached as **Exhibit B**.

• • • • • • • • • • •
Deposition of Hector Ruiz, 798:15-23,
800:8-17, and 801:6-20; Ruiz Exhibit 6147.4
Intel's Opening Brief also cited a second Ruiz statement,
••••••
Intel. Op. Br. 10. Ruiz testified in his deposition that
Deposition of Hector
Ruiz, 810:22-811:10.
• • • • • • • • • • •

4. In addition to omitting testimony establishing the context for these former AMD
executives' statements Intel omits other deposition testimony from Sanders, Rivet,
and Ruiz clearly establishing that
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Deposition of Jerry Sanders, 113:19-115:1. Rivet explained that

⁴ A true and correct of the relevant pages from the Ruiz Deposition transcript is attached as **Exhibit C**. A true and correct of Exhibit 6147 of the Ruiz Deposition is attached as **Exhibit D**. Exhibit 6147 of the Ruiz Deposition is identical to Exhibit 25 of the Floyd Declaration filed with this Court on November 21, 2008.

Deposition of Bob Rivet, 70:5-22.	He further testified that '	• • • • • • • • • • • •
	• • • • • • • • • •	• • • •
·······················Id. Rivet characterized	• • •	• • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • •	• • • • • • • • •	<i>Id.</i> at 263:14-264:1.
• • • • • • • • •	Ruiz testified	that
	• • • • • • • • • •	• • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • •	Deposition of Hector Rui	iz, 497:1-16.
• • • • •	• • • • • • • • •	Ruiz testified that
	• • • • • • • • •	• • • •
<i>Id.</i> at 1033:4-1034:5.		
5. Finally,	· · · · · · · AMD antici	pates submitting expert testimony
demonstrating that	• • • • •	• • • • • • • •
	• • • • • • • • • •	• • • •
• • •		
		Intel's current motion
thus raises issues involving not on	ly the FTAIA jurisdictional	issue but also
For that reason, t	he Court should defer rulin	g on Intel's motion until the Court
has the full benefit of the experts	' analysis of	• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•

In sum, Intel's Supplemental Submission ignores the relevant legal question in this case, and repeats the key factual distortion underlying Intel's motion. Certainly nothing cited by Intel

eliminates any disputed factual issue, and hence any jury question, over the reasons AMD phased out its domestic microprocessor production at Fab 25, and whether it would have done so absent Intel's misconduct. And forthcoming expert testimony will only further undermine Intel's position on that question. The motion to dismiss or for summary judgment should be denied.

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Dated: May 26, 2009

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 26, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF and have sent by Hand Delivery and Electronic Mail to the following:

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I hereby certify that on May 26, 2009, I have sent by Electronic Mail the foregoing document to the following non-registered participants:

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 2, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF and have sent by Hand Delivery and Electronic Mail to the following:

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